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Background: Mandatory reporting of meticillin-resist-
ant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) bloodstream infec-
tions (BSI) has occurred in England for over 15 years. 
Epidemiological information is recorded, but routine 
collection of isolates for characterisation has not 
been routinely undertaken. Ongoing developments in 
whole-genome sequencing (WGS) have demonstrated 
its value in outbreak investigations and for determin-
ing the spread of antimicrobial resistance and bacte-
rial population structure. Benefits of adding genomics 
to routine epidemiological MRSA surveillance are 
unknown. Aim: To determine feasibility and potential 
utility of adding genomics to epidemiological surveil-
lance of MRSA. Methods: We conducted an epidemio-
logical and genomic survey of MRSA BSI in England 
over a 1-year period (1 October 2012–30 September 
2013). Results: During the study period, 903 cases of 
MRSA BSI were reported; 425 isolates were available 
for sequencing of which, 276 (65%) were clonal com-
plex (CC) 22. Addition of 64 MRSA genomes from pub-
lished outbreak investigations showed that the study 
genomes could provide context for outbreak isolates 
and supported cluster identification. Comparison to 
other MRSA genome collections demonstrated varia-
tion in clonal diversity achieved through different sam-
pling strategies and identified potentially high-risk 
clones e.g. USA300 and local expansion of CC5 MRSA 
in South West England. Conclusions: We demonstrate 
the potential utility of combined epidemiological and 
genomic MRSA BSI surveillance to determine the 
national population structure of MRSA, contextualise 
previous MRSA outbreaks, and detect potentially high-
risk lineages. These findings support the integration 
of epidemiological and genomic surveillance for MRSA 
BSI as a step towards a comprehensive surveillance 
programme in England.
Introduction
In 2001, faced with increasingly high rates of meticillin-
resistant Staphylococcus aureus  (MRSA) bloodstream 
infections (BSI) at the turn of the century, the United 
Kingdom (UK) Department of Health mandated 
surveillance of MRSA BSI in England. This was followed 
in 2005 by enhanced surveillance to collect clinical 
and epidemiological information [1,2]. A number of 
infection prevention and control (IPC) measures were 
also introduced, such as strengthened antimicrobial 
stewardship, MRSA screening with decolonisation of 
all emergency hospital admissions [3] and use of care 
bundles for patients with intravascular catheters and 
indwelling urinary catheters [4]. Over the past decade, 
there has been a remarkable decline in the incidence 
of MRSA BSI in England [1,2]. Surveillance and IPC 
interventions are likely to have played a major role in 
this success, although it is unclear whether potential 
changes in the epidemiology of MRSA may also have 
contributed [5,6].
The national MRSA BSI surveillance programme 
conducted by Public Health England (PHE) did not 
include routine submission of isolates for characteri-
sation. Isolates submitted to the PHE Staphylococcal 
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Reference Service were highly selected and were sub-
mitted in order to type isolates for the investigation of 
suspected nosocomial and community outbreaks, for 
selected sentinel surveillance programmes and/or to 
detect specific genes in isolates from patients with sus-
pected toxin-mediated disease. Strain characterisation 
was undertaken using staphylococcal protein A (spa-) 
typing, multilocus sequence typing (MLST), SCCmec-
subtyping and toxin gene profiling. It is possible that 
a large amount of information regarding the population 
of disease-causing MRSA in England may have been 
missed as a result of this ad hoc approach.
Figure 1
Map with breakdown of the proportions of each CC within the sequenced PHE bloodstream infection isolate collection 
from submitting regions, England, 1 October 2012–30 September 2013 (n = 425)
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Microbial WGS provides increased discriminatory 
power to resolve outbreaks and identify emerging 
MRSA lineages compared with conventional typ-
ing methods [7]. WGS has been used to investigate 
MRSA outbreaks in the UK [8-12] and to examine the 
population genetic structure of MRSA in the UK and 
globally [13,14]. These studies have largely been con-
ducted through grant-funded academic research, 
rather than by public health programmes, using iso-
lates from surveillance programmes such as the 
British Society of Antimicrobial Chemotherapy (BSAC) 
Antibiotic Resistance Surveillance Programme [13] or 
the European Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance 
Network, EARS-Net [15]. Both programmes systemati-
cally collect a subset of bloodstream isolates from sen-
tinel laboratories and routinely undertake phenotypic 
typing methods. Both programmes were established 
to monitor antimicrobial resistance, before the wide-
spread use of WGS.
Combined with comprehensive, systematic sampling 
regimens WGS technologies now provide the oppor-
tunity to study the natural history of successful MRSA 
clones at great resolution and to identify clonal expan-
sions to monitor in case of widespread dissemination 
[16]. National BSI surveillance was originally introduced 
in England to compare MRSA rates between hospitals 
and later enhanced to aid direction of clinical inter-
ventions [2]. We conducted a proof-of-principle study 
to determine the feasibility and potential benefits of 
combining prospective epidemiological and genomic 
surveillance of MRSA BSI on a national scale within 
a public health organisation. We aimed to determine 
what information could be gathered by combining epi-
demiological surveillance and routine whole-genome 
sequencing of isolates and to identify the potential 
obstacles to implementation of this strategy.
Methods
Study design, setting and participants
We conducted a prospective, observational cohort 
study of all cases of MRSA BSI in England from 1 October 
2012 to 30 September 2013. Cases were defined as 
those patients reported to PHE as having a blood cul-
ture positive for MRSA by the submitting laboratory. At 
the time of the study the population of England, served 
by PHE, was approximately 53.4 million.
Data sources
In accordance with national policy, epidemiological 
and microbiological data on MRSA BSI cases is sub-
mitted electronically to the mandatory enhanced sur-
veillance scheme (MESS) by infection control teams in 
acute National Health Service (NHS) Trusts. Mandatory 
data variables included patient demographics, details 
of hospital admission, date of BSI and location of 
acquisition (community or hospital). Epidemiological 
and microbiological data of cases with BSI during 
the study period was extracted from this database 
for use in this study. PHE reference laboratory test 
results were initially linked with demographic, clinical 
and geographic information from the MESS and then 
anonymised by PHE staff. Anonymised data were sub-
sequently linked to DNA sequence data by University of 
Cambridge staff.
Isolate collection and laboratory testing
During the study period, all NHS diagnostic microbi-
ology laboratories in England were invited to submit 
MRSA bloodstream isolates to the Staphylococcal 
Reference Laboratory, PHE Colindale, for charac-
terisation. Isolates were cultured on nutrient agar 
and underwent  spa-typing [17] and multiplex PCR to 
confirm species identification and determination of 
the  mecA  and  luk-PV  status [18]. Isolates were stored 
at -80 °C using Microbank cryovials (Pro-Laboratory 
Diagnostics, Cheshire, UK) pending further analyses.
DNA extraction and whole genome sequencing
Isolates were retrieved from storage, sub-cultured onto 
nutrient agar slopes, and transferred to the Department 
of Medicine at the University of Cambridge. Each sam-
ple was cultured onto Columbia Blood Agar (Oxoid, 
Basingstoke, UK) and identified using a commercial 
latex agglutination kit (Pastorex Staph Plus, Bio Rad 
Laboratories, Hemel Hempstead, UK). Antimicrobial 
susceptibility testing was performed using the Vitek-2 
system (bioMérieux, Marcy l’Etoile, France). DNA was 
extracted, libraries prepared, and 150-bp paired-end 
sequences determined on an Illumina HiSeq2000 as 
previously described [19]. Phylogenetic trees were 
visualised using FigTree (http://tree.bio.ed.ac.uk/soft-
ware/figtree/) and iTOL (http://itol.embl.de/).
Ethical statement
Written informed consent was not required for this study 
as data and isolates were collected as part of national 
surveillance programme for MRSA bloodstream infec-
tions, which is exempt from this requirement.
The study protocol was approved by the National 
Research Ethics Service (ref: 11/EE/0499), and by the 
Cambridge University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust 
R&D Department (ref: A092428).
Genomic analysis
Genomes were assembled using an assembly and 
improvement pipeline [20]. MLST sequence types (STs) 
were assigned from the sequence data [21] (https://
github.com/sanger-pathogens/mlst_check) and STs 
were assigned to clonal complexes (CC). Sequence data 
were mapped using SMALT (http://www.sanger.ac.uk/
science/tools/smalt-0) to the reference genome for 
particular CCs (CC5, N315, GenBank  accession  number 
BA000018; CC8, FPR3757, GenBank  accession  number 
CP000255; CC22, EMRSA15, GenBank  acces-
sion  number HE681097). The core genome alignment 
excluding mobile genetic elements, indels and repeti-
tive regions was generated for each CC and was used 
in phylogenetic estimates using RAxML with 100 boot-
straps [22].
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Isolates were  spa  genotyped using  in-silico  PCR to 
extract the spa gene X region from assembled genomes 
using previously described primers [23]. The  spa-type 
was determined using an online spa-typer tool (http://
spatyper.fortinbras.us/). The types generated through 
spa-genotype and laboratory determined  spa-typing 
methods were compared to determine concordance.
Bacterial DNA sequences were deposited in the 
European Nucleotide Archive (ENA), (https://www.ebi.
ac.uk/ena), under study number ERP005128. Accession 
numbers, details of reads, depth of coverage and N50 
are provided in  Supplementary Table S1. For subse-
quent analyses we sourced MRSA sequence data from 
previously published studies. These included: (i) a pro-
spective observational cohort study of all MRSA car-
riage and clinical isolates submitted and processed in 
Cambridge University Hospital NHS Foundation Trust, 
Cambridgeshire, UK between 2012 and 2013 [24], (ii) 
MRSA bloodstream isolates collected by the BSAC BSI 
Surveillance Programme between 2001 and 2010 [13], 
(iii) USA300 isolates collected in New York, United 
States (US) between 2009 and 2011 [25], (iv) MRSA 
Figure 2
Phylogenetic tree comparing CC 22 PHE BSI isolates, England, October 2012-September 2013 (n = 276) to a single isolate 
per patient from the previously published universal sample collection from Cambridgeshire, England, April 2012–April 2013 
(n = 1035)
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BSI: Blood stream infections; CC: clonal complex; PHE: Public Health England; SNPs: single nucleotide polymorphisms.
Public Health England bloodstream infections CC22 isolates (n = 276) are indicated by red branches. The first isolate from each patient from 
the previously published universal sample collection from Cambridgeshire (n = 1,035) are indicated by the blue branches [24].
Mid-point rooted maximum likelihood tree based on SNPs in the core genome alignment generated after mapping against the reference 
genome EMRSA-15. The inner ring denotes the collection and the outer represents referral network of submitting laboratory. The arc indicates 
a large expansion in the Cambridgeshire region, which is underrepresented in the BSI only surveillance.
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isolates from outbreak investigations at a UK hospital 
[9,10,12].
Results
A total of 903 MRSA BSI cases were reported to MESS 
during the study period (Supplementary Figure S1). 
Gender was recorded for 98% of cases and 584 (65%) 
of cases were male. Age was recorded for all but two 
cases, with a median age of 72 years (range 0–103 
years; interquartile range (IQR) 56–84 years). A total of 
111 laboratories participated in the study.
A total of 559 MRSA bloodstream isolates were received. 
Following quality control procedures 134 isolates were 
excluded, and 425 isolates were included in the analy-
sis. The reasons of exclusion were as follows: dupli-
cate isolates (n = 50); not MRSA (n = 15); inadequate 
isolate growth (n = 2); isolates collected outside of the 
Figure 3
Diversity of lineages (CC) within three isolate collections: carriage and clinical samples from the Cambridgeshire study of 
MRSAa; the national PHE BSI collectionb and a national BSAC BSI collectionc
BSAC BSI PHE National BSICambridgeshire 
Clinical & Screening 
(n=1,465)
0
25
50
75
100
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
Collection
Clonal Complex
(n=425)(n=1,013)
1
5
7
8
9
12
22
15
25
30
45
59
71
72
80
88
97
130
152
361
398
425
779
1943
Unknown
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a Carriage and clinical samples from a 1-year-long Cambridgeshire study of MRSA (April 2012–April 2013) [24].
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study dates (n = 16); isolates submitted in error (n = 3); 
non-bloodstream isolates (n = 2); isolates from Wales 
(n = 28); and isolates from Northern Ireland (n = 18).
Of 903 reported BSI cases occurring in England dur-
ing the study period, 47% (n  =  425) had isolates that 
were sequenced and analysed (Figure 1). All of the 425 
sequenced isolates were mecA positive by laboratory-
PCR. PCR testing identified 8.7% (n = 37) of the isolates 
as PVL-positive. Based on sequence data, 65% (n = 276) 
were assigned to CC22. Other CCs were represented at 
lower frequencies: CC5 n = 42; CC30 n = 33; CC8 n = 22; 
CC1 n = 19; CC59 n = 9; CC45 n = 7; other/unknown CCs 
n = 17. The number of isolates and variation in the CCs 
isolated from each region is shown in Figure 1. No asso-
ciations were found between particular CCs and com-
munity vs hospital onset (Supplementary Table S2).
Comparison of blood stream infection 
surveillance and universal methicillin-
resistant Staphylococcus aureus sampling
We compared the most common clone in our collec-
tion, CC22 (n = 276), with CC22 genomes generated 
by a prospective study that sequenced MRSA isolates 
from every positive case (carriage and clinical sam-
ples) identified at a single diagnostic microbiology 
laboratory that processed samples from three hos-
pitals and 75 general practitioner (GP) surgeries in 
Cambridgeshire between April 2012 and April 2013 [24]. 
This Cambridgeshire collection was used to represent 
the diversity of carriage and clinical isolates within a 
defined geographical area, as a national collection 
of carriage and clinical isolates was not available. A 
phylogeny was constructed for the genomes from the 
national BSI collection within this Cambridgeshire col-
lection (Figure 2), in order to determine whether those 
isolates causing BSI were clonally related, or distrib-
uted throughout the phylogenetic tree.
As shown in  Figure 2, isolates from our national 
MRSA BSI collection were dispersed throughout the 
Cambridgeshire phylogeny, ruling out any association 
between a particular lineage and BSI. Comparing the 
national BSI collection to WGS of universal sampling in 
Cambridgeshire also demonstrates that some lineages 
are under-represented when undertaking BSI-based 
(rather than clinical/carriage based) surveillance. For 
example, a large expansion (indicated with an arc on 
the figure) was seen in the Cambridgeshire phylogeny, 
with only eight of the Cambridgeshire isolates within 
the national MRSA BSI collection from the East of 
England.
To explore the effect of different sampling strategies 
on MRSA lineage diversity we conducted a compari-
son of CCs within three different MRSA collections: this 
national MRSA BSI collection (October 2012–October 
2013), isolates from the Cambridgeshire study (April 
2012–April 2013) [24], and MRSA BSI isolates from the 
British Society of Antimicrobial Chemotherapy (BSAC) 
BSI Surveillance Programme from 2000–2010 [13] 
(Figure 3). Despite the different sampling strategies 
and time frames, we found that CC22 was the domi-
nant lineage in all collections. Both of the BSI-based 
collections showed a lower diversity of lineages than 
seen in the 1-year Cambridgeshire study. Furthermore, 
the BSAC collection, which collected BSI from up to 40 
laboratories in the UK between 2001 and 2010, showed 
the most limited diversity. This may have resulted from 
a decline in certain lineages e.g. EMRSA-16 (CC30) dur-
ing the 10-year collection period.
Contextualisation of previously recognised 
outbreaks
Reuter  et al.  have previously demonstrated that it is 
possible to use sequence data from BSAC MRSA BSI 
collection (2001–2010) to provide genomic context for 
local MRSA outbreaks within a single hospital setting 
[13]. We conducted a similar analysis, using the national 
MRSA BSI collection as context, to see if this might be 
feasible using a smaller sample of BSI collected during 
the study period of 1-year. We found that previous out-
breaks in a neonatal intensive care unit [10] and a pae-
diatric intensive care unit [9] were easily identifiable as 
discrete clusters, as shown in  Figure 4. Furthermore, 
MRSA isolates from a suspected outbreak on a hepatol-
ogy ward [12] were scattered throughout the phylogeny, 
refuting the outbreak as had been shown previously.
Monitoring and detection of emerging or high-
risk lineages
One key aim of a national MRSA surveillance is the 
identification and monitoring of emerging and/or high-
risk MRSA lineages. One such lineage is the USA300 
lineage, which was first identified in 1999 and has 
subsequently caused an epidemic of skin and soft tis-
sue infection (SSTI) in the US [26,27]. The widespread 
dissemination of USA300 in otherwise healthy people 
and its spread into hospitals has made this a high-risk 
strain. However, despite multiple introductions into a 
number of countries, genomic surveillance has shown 
that to date, minimal transmission of USA300 has 
occurred in Europe [28-32]. We examined the national 
MRSA BSI collection and found that six of the 22 CC8 
isolates were phylogenetically defined as USA300 and 
were widely dispersed throughout the collection, indi-
cating multiple introductions of USA300 into England 
(Figure 5). Given the observation that USA300 is com-
monly associated with SSTI (which are rarely sampled), 
and the limitations of BSI-based sampling, it is likely 
that the prevalence of USA300 in the UK may be higher 
than detected in this study.
Another potential benefit of having access to national 
surveillance data is the ability to identify and explore 
changes in molecular epidemiology on a local scale. By 
way of an example, we found an expansion of CC5 in 
South West England (Figure 6), which was genetically 
distinct from a CC5 expansion in Wales identified in 
the BSAC collection [13], despite their close geographic 
proximity.
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Backward compatibility of typing methods
Globally, PCR determination of  spa-type is a com-
monly used typing method. However, as some labora-
tories transition to WGS-based typing, it is important 
that typing methods remain compatible. We exam-
ined the concordance between these two methods in 
the national MRSA BSI collection. Of the 425 isolates 
we found a 98.4% concordance rate (Supplementary 
Table S2), comparable to previous studies [33,34]. 
Of the seven isolates with discordant results, there 
were deletions/rearrangements within the  spa  gene 
of the short-read assemblies that resulted in loss of 
sequence complementary to forward primer, and thus 
failure to  in silico amplify the gene region targeted by 
genomic spa-typing.
Discussion
Mandatory enhanced surveillance for MRSA BSI in 
England has provided in-depth information on the 
national decline of MRSA BSI and the changes in 
patient-level epidemiology that have accompanied it 
[2]. However, without characterisation of systemati-
cally collected isolates, bacterial molecular epidemiol-
ogy cannot be studied. This study aimed to investigate 
whether it was feasible to undertake combined epide-
miological and genomic surveillance of MRSA blood-
stream infections in England in order to address this 
issue.
Figure 4
Phylogenetic tree showing CC 22 isolates from the PHE BSI collection, England, October 2012–September 2013 (n = 276) 
providing contextualisation of previously published outbreaks at Cambridge University Hospitals, England (n = 64)
Collection
PHE BSI
SCBU
NICU
Hepatology
~ 50 SNPs
EMRSA15 Reference
BSI: bloodstream infections; NICU: neonatal intensive care unit; PHE: Public Health England; SCBU: special care baby unit; SNPs: single 
nucleotide polymorphisms.
Mid-point rooted maximum likelihood tree based on SNPs in the core genome alignment generated after mapping against the reference 
genome EMRSA-15. Isolates from NICU (n = 7) are indicated in green [10]. Isolates from an outbreak on a SCBU which extended into 
epidemiologically linked cases in the community (n = 15) are indicated in purple [9]. Isolates from a suspected but disproven outbreak on a 
hepatology ward (n = 42) are indicated in blue [12].
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We encountered some challenges including obtaining 
bloodstream isolates from all participating hospitals 
(as submission was voluntary) and integrating two 
datasets collected through different methods (epide-
miological data collected through an online database 
submission and isolates sent with written informa-
tion via post/courier). Despite this, we demonstrated 
the feasibility of this approach. We were able to con-
struct the known population structure and diversity of 
MRSA in England, even with an incomplete collection 
of bloodstream isolates collected over a 1-year period. 
We found a greater diversity of clones than that seen 
in a 10-year national collection of MRSA bloodstream 
isolates (BSAC collection) with a limited sampling 
strategy, but less diversity than that seen in a 1-year 
regional collection of carriage and clinical isolates 
(Cambridgeshire study [24]). A sensible first step in 
MRSA surveillance is to assess existing genomic diver-
sity [16] and our study demonstrates that this can be 
achieved and could feasibly be extended over time to 
generate a comprehensive national genomic database 
to monitor changes in clonal diversity.
Prior to April 2017, all MRSA BSI isolates submitted 
to PHE were routinely characterised by  spa-typing 
and PCR to confirm species identification alongside 
Figure 5
Phylogenetic tree showing USA300 isolates from the PHE BSI collection, alongside previously published USA300 isolates 
from a universal sample collection in Cambridgeshire and from the United States
~100 SNPs
FPR3757 reference
USA
Cambridge
PHE BSI
PHE: Public Health England; SNPs: single nucleotide polymorphisms; USA: United States of America.
PHE BSI USA300 isolates (n = 6) are indicated in red. USA300 isolates from a universal sample collection in Cambridgeshire (n = 24) are 
indicated in orange [24] and from the US (n = 348) in blue [25].
Mid-point rooted maximum likelihood tree based on SNPs in the core genome alignment generated after mapping against the reference 
genome FPR3757 (black).
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Figure 6
Phylogenetic tree showing PHE CC5 bloodstream infection isolates, 1 October 2012–30 September 2013 (n=42) and CC5 
isolates from the previously published BSAC collection of bloodstream infections, 2000–2010 (n=28)
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BSAC: British Society of Antimicrobial Chemotherapy; BSI: blood stream infections; CC: clonal complex; PHE: Public Health England; SNPs: 
single nucleotide polymorphisms.
PHE BSI CC5 isolates (n = 42) indicated by red branches. National BSI BSAC collection (n = 28) indicated by blue branches [13].
Mid-point rooted maximum likelihood tree based on SNPs in the core genome alignment generated after mapping against the CC5 reference 
genome N315. Coloured bar represents referral network of submitting laboratory. Expansions within the South West England and Welsh 
regions are highlighted.
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determination of  mecA/C  and  luk-PV  status [17,18]. As 
typing methods evolve and WGS becomes increasingly 
routine, backward compatibility with previous methods 
ensures the continued utility of typed historical collec-
tions. Laboratory  spa-typing and  spa-genotyping from 
short read WGS data have been shown to be largely 
comparable in a limited number of studies [33,34], 
despite the high density of repeats within the spa gene 
region. We showed over 98% concordance between 
laboratory and genomic  spa-typing methods which, 
reassuringly, confirms compatibility with historical 
data.
A further potential benefit of prospective sequencing of 
MRSA bloodstream isolates and a centralised national 
database is the ability to provide genomic context to 
confirm or refute outbreaks on a local or a national 
scale. This would be an invaluable resource as long as 
there is open access to anonymised (non-identifiable) 
data and to bioinformatics tools to analyse them rap-
idly and easily. The challenges will be to ensure stand-
ardised methods, development of strategies to avoid 
duplication of samples and establishment of a large, 
comprehensive, open access, anonymised database 
where data could be deposited, curated and accessi-
ble for public health benefit. Web-based, open-access 
software packages that are potentially suitable for this 
purpose are already being developed [35,36]. Apart 
from the ability to detect emerging or potentially high-
risk MRSA clones retrospectively, on-going sampling 
and analysis will enable detection in real-time.
In this study, we found that that the high-risk USA300 
lineage, an epidemic cause of SSTI in the US [26], has 
spread to the UK and is causing bloodstream infections 
across England. While the genomic data suggest multi-
ple introductions of USA300, the use of BSI rather than 
clinical isolate-based surveillance limits our ability to 
analyse this further. However, using the PHE BSI collec-
tion it was possible to identify a local expansion of CC5 
causing BSI in South West England, where local inves-
tigations suggest this clone has been causing excess 
disease [37]. Thus, timely, routine WGS of PHE BSI iso-
lates combined with local epidemiological data could 
potentially identify novel and/or pathogenic lineages in 
real time and could be used to trigger local /regional 
investigations and interventions.
A major advantage of sequencing MRSA isolates is 
the ability to share and collate genome sequence data 
to build up national and international databases. A 
number of BSI surveillance systems already exist e.g. 
the English mandatory enhanced surveillance sys-
tem, the voluntary British Society of Antimicrobial 
Chemotherapy BSI Surveillance Programme and the vol-
untary European Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance 
Network. While each system has different aims and 
objectives, sampling criteria and data collection 
methods, the digital interchangeability of sequence 
data creates an opportunity to collaborate and share 
genome sequence data while producing a sustainable, 
on-going resource if the isolates were sequenced. The 
challenges will be to ensure standardised methods, 
development of strategies to avoid duplication of sam-
ples and establishment of a large, comprehensive, 
open-access database where anonymised data could 
be deposited, curated, and accessible for public health 
benefit.
We acknowledge several limitations in our study. The 
systems for collecting epidemiological data and bac-
terial isolates were separate and different, leading 
to high rates of sample exclusion. This challenge of 
capturing and integrating both types of data could be 
overcome in practice by submitting epidemiological 
and laboratory data to a single data collection system. 
Submission of bloodstream isolates was voluntary, with 
many reported cases having no corresponding isolate 
referred for characterisation; this may have introduced 
bias into the analysis. This could be addressed by hav-
ing mandatory submission of isolates for all reported 
cases. Finally, we did not conduct a cost/benefit analy-
sis of this approach. Despite these limitations, we have 
demonstrated that prospective epidemiological and 
genomic surveillance of MRSA bloodstream infections 
is feasible, has numerous potential benefits and could 
provide a valuable public health resource in England 
and beyond.
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